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Probert: Negligence and Economic Damage: The California-Florida Nexus

NEGLIGENCE AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE:
THE CALIFORNIA-FLORIDA NEXUS
WALTEI PROBT*

Historically, the availability of a remedy for negligence has depended upon
the type of interest affected. While over the past few decades the availability of
a cause of action in tort for personal injuries has increased dramatically, legal
protection of purely economic interests has been slow in developing. Although
loss of earnings, loss of profit, and other economic damage have been traditionally compensated in the ordinary negligence claim when "parasitic" to a
physical injury, such damages have not been available outside of a contractual
relationship in cases involving purely economic loss. Courts are, however, beginning to reconsider doctrines which inhibited recovery for such damages.
The most rapid expansion of the cause of action for damage to economic
interests is occurring in service transactions. Historically, if the negligent performance of a contract to provide service resulted in purely economic harm, no
cause of action existed unless the aggrieved party had a contractual relationship with the party providing the services., The privity barrier is, however,
eroding due to the increasing willingness of courts to protect purely economic
interests.
The history of this development originated with the English case of
Winterbottom v. Wright2 and its enunciation of the privity doctrine. Underlying the doctrine was the assumption that the cost of negligence was best allocated by the contracting parties through negotiation or simply left to fate
and the marketplace. The doctrine of privity predominated until 1916 when
Justice Cardozo wrote his famous opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.8
which led to the demise of the privity barrier for product-related personal injuries. Personal injury claims which arose from construction or other service
contracts were subsequently excepted from the privity requirement. Nevertheless, the requirement remained intact for claims resulting from negligently
inflicted economic damage stemming from service transactions. Even in that
area, however, the barrier is now being eroded in California, Florida and other
jurisdictions. In those states, a great variety of independent contractors have
been held liable for purely economic damage to individuals directly affected by
their performance but with whom there was no contractual relationship.4
*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S., J.D., University of Oregon; J.S.D., Yale.
My sincere appreciation to Jacalyn Kolk for her research assistance and to Robert A.
Hendricks, Atlanta attorney, with whom exploration of this area began.
1. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
2. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
3. 217 N.Y. 882, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4. Although the emphasis of this article is on economic damage claims stemming from a
defendant's negligent performance of a contract, this work will also consider claims for such
damage arising from negligence in any activity. With minor exceptions, courts have denied
claims for negligent interference with contract. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,
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California led the trend away from the privity doctrine in Biakanja v.
Irving,5 the most influential decision in the area. The Florida supreme court
6
subsequently joined the Biakanja movement in Moyer v. Graham. That decision, along with the ensuing interpretations in Florida's lower appellate
courts, places Florida in the vanguard in the development of a cause of action
for economic damage. Nevertheless, Florida's precise position is somewhat
clouded due to inconsistencies and ambiguities in both the Moyer decision
and the lower court interpretations.
The purpose of this article is to compare developments in California and
Florida, partly to clarify Florida's situation, but also to provide for an examination of this area on a national level. This article will examine how
cases involving abstracters, accountants, architects, engineers, contractors,
lawyers and others demonstrate the increasing judicial recognition of claims
for purely economic damage. Nevertheless, this article will also demonstrate
that, due to the unique circumstances inherent in each type of service activity,
the various activities may not always be evaluated together.
Tni:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of the privity barrier to recovery for economic damages began
with Lord Abinger's opinion in Winterbottom. In Winterbottom, the injured
driver of a coach was unable to sustain a cause of action against the party responsible for maintenance of the coach because there was no privity between
the two. Lord Abinger's principal objection against permitting claims between
parties having no contractual relationship was the possibility that an "infinity
of actions" would ensue.7 Although Winterbottom involved a claim for personal injuries, its expressed policy was to limit an individual's economic responsibility for any kind of negligently inflicted harm to those parties with
whom a contractual relationship existed. However, while after Winterbottom
the privity concept was being questioned with regard to defective products and
personal injuries, it was being reinforced in situations involving intangible
economic damage. Two cases exemplifying this entrenchment were decided
around the turn of the century and involved claims against lawyers.
In National Savings Bank v. Ward,s the plaintiff, a bank, made a loan in
reliance on a certificate of title prepared by the defendant. The United States
Supreme Court denied recovery for economic damage because the plaintiff
lacked privity with the defendant. Meanwhile, the California Supreme Court,
in Buckley v. Gray,9 refused to permit a frustrated beneficiary to sue a lawyer
275 U.S. 303 (1927). In Robins, the plaintiff alleged that because of the defendant's negligence
he had lost the use of a ship which he did not own. Justice Holmes said, "The law does not
spread its protection so far." See James, Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused

by Negligence: A PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REv. 43 (1972); Note, Negligent Interference with Contract: Knowledge as a Standard for Recovery, 63 VA. L. REv. 813 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF ToRTs, §766C (1979).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 infra.
285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973). See text accompanying notes 32-39 infra.
152 Eng. Rep. at 404.
100 U.S. 195 (1879).
Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339.42 P. 900 (1895).
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whose negligence caused the testator's will to be declared invalid. Both courts
relied on Winterbottom, reiterating Lord Abinger's fear that permitting plaintiffs to sue defendants with whom they had no contractual relationship would
open the floodgates to endless litigation. The California court further articulated the equally important point implicit in Winterbottom that if a third
party could sue to enforce the contract, it would deprive the contracting parties
of their ability to control their economic risk.'0 If liability were extended beyond the contracting parties, the mere apprehension of potential claims and
accompanying costs would unduly burden not only the specific activities involved in a particular case but all commercial and professional enterprise.
Controlling the "floodgates" remains an important consideration to this
day. Nevertheless, the balancing of fairness and utility" which swept aside the
privity barrier in product-related personal injury actions following MacPherson, was also employed by Justice Cardozo in a claim for purely economic
damage in Glanzer v. Shephard.12 In Glanzer, a bean seller employed a public
weigher to provide the buyer with a certificate of weight. Due to the weigher's
negligent overcalculation of the beans' weight, the buyer overpaid the seller.
After noting the significance of his MacPherson analysis in this setting, Justice
Cardozo distinguished the facts in Glanzer from those in National Savings. In
National Savings, the lawyer did not know the prospective use of the certificate
of title he prepared, while in Glanzer, the public weigher knew that the buyer
must rely on the certificate of weight.' 3 Because the weigher was cognizant of
the economic risk and it was within his exclusive control, the court believed
that it was fair to place the risk on the weigher. Unlike MacPherson,however,
Glanzer had little short-term effect.
Nearly a decade after Glanzer was decided, Justice Cardozo again examined
the propriety of the privity requirement in a claim for economic damages. In
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,'4 plaintiff sought to recover against an accounting
firm for negligent preparation of a certified financial statement. Unlike
Glanzer, the class of potential plaintiffs relying on the financial statement was
both large and indefinite. Without the privity limitation, reasoned Cardozo,
accountants, lawyers, and others providing services relied upon by numerous
individuals, would be subject "to a liability in an indeterminate amount for
'
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class."'
THE CALiFoRorA DEVELOPMENT

Following Glanzer and Ultramares there was little weakening of the
10. This concern is particularly noticeable in the products area. See notes 53-56 and ac-

companying text, infra.
11.

Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972). Despite

contemporary tendencies of analysts to deemphasize the significance of fault in tort law, the
concept is relevant to the subject of this article. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 8d
799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21
Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978).
12. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
13. Id. at 242, 135 N.E. at 277.
14. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
15. Id.at 179, 174 N.. at 444.
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privity barrier to claims for economic damages until 1958 when the California
Supreme Court decided Biakanja v. Irving.6 Biakanja involved a claim
against a notary public who engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and
failed to properly execute a will. As a result, plaintiff's share of the estate was
reduced to the percentage prescribed in California's intestate laws. Pointing
out that the notary, like the bean weigher in Glanzer, had been employed to
provide a specific service for a known third party, the court found the notary
liable. Although the court disregarded the privity doctrine, the approach it
did adopt was more restrictive of economic injury claims than a mere foreseeability standard. The court stated that in a suit for negligent performance of a
contract when the parties are not in privity, liability:
"is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors,
among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
blame attached
17
future harm.'
Shortly after Biakanja, the notary's duty to the beneficiary was extended
to lawyers drafting wills.:s The Biakanja reasoning was then extended to a
variety of transactions producing claims for economic damage, 19 including
16. 49 Cal. 2d at 648, 320 P.2d 16, 17.
17. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19. Prevention of future harm was weighed most heavily in
Biakanja. The only person who might conceivably have a deterring remedy was the beneficiary.
18. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). This duty was
later extended to include the drafting of a trust instrument. Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976).
19. See, e.g., J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407
(1979) (general contractor); Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976)
(architects); United States Financial v. Sullivan, 37 Cal. App. 3d 5, 112 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1974)
(developer); Oakes v. McCarthy Co., 267 Cal. App. 2d 231, 73 Cal. Rptr. 127 (1968) (engineers).
For cases involving lenders, see, Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 241, 129 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1976); Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal. 850,
447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969). But see, Kinner v. World Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57 Cal.
App.3d 724, 129 Cal. Rptr. 400 (1976); Fox & Carskadon Financial Corp. v. San Francisco Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 52 Cal. App. lid 484, 125 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1975); Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal.
App. 2d 466, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969); Gill v. Mission Say. & Loan Ass'n, 236 Cal. App. 2d
753, 46 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1965). Stoiber v. Honeychuck, 101 Cal. App. 3d 903, 162 Cal. Rptr. 194
(1980) (rental property manager); Jackson v. Aetna Life & Gas. Co., 93 Cal. App. 3d 838, 155
Cal. Rptr. 905 (1979) (insurer); Chameleon Eng'r Corp. v. Air Dynamics, Inc., 101 Cal. App.
3d 418, 161 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1980) (supplier). But see Austero v. National Gas. Co. of Detroit,
Mich., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1976) (insurer).
A duty relationship may be undertaken in other ways than by contract. See, e.g., Barrera
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969)
(negligent delay in processing insurance application); Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769,
97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (gratuitous undertaking); Walnut Creek Aggregates Co. v. Testing
Eng'rs, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 690, 56 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1967) (gratuitous advice). See Probert
& Hendricks, Lawyer Malpractice:Duty Relationships Beyond Contract, 55 NoTRE DAME LAW.
708, 719 (1980); Note, Liability to Third Parties for Economic Injury: Privity As a Useful
Animal, or a Blind Imitation of the Past, 12 Sw. UNIV. L. Ray. 87, 104 (1981).
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those involving expert opinions and evaluations prepared for the use of known
third parties.20 Although the six criteria set forth in Biakanja have remained
important in determining liability, others have been added. For example, the
California Supreme Court has expressed concern that overexpansion of the
obligations of attorneys might unduly burden the profession.21 Additionally,
the court has shown increasing sensitivity to its role in economic risk allocation. Thus, considerations such as the availability of insurance2 and whether
a risk is customarily borne by plaintiff's enterprise have become significant. 23
The erosion of the privity doctrine in suits for economic damage in California is a part of the general development of tort law. The privity barrier
erected in Winterbottom gave control of economic risk allocation to the
contracting parties. However, subsequent decisions in the personal injury area
imposed a duty on enterprisers to bear the costs of the damage negligently
caused by their goods or services. Thus, enterprisers are encouraged to reduce
the costs attributable to their negligence through the exercise of due care and
to shift such costs to consumers generally.
While Biakanja and its progeny extend the concept of risk allocation to
economic injury actions, special treatment is necessary to avoid a flood of
liability. The definition and scope of an enterpriser's duty does require special
consideration when the claim is for -purely economic loss. California's approach is finely tuned to this concern. That approach is to limit the class of
individuals possessing a right of action. Biakanja has been construed to require a close relationship or "nexus" between the plaintiff's injury and the
Some cases have not required that an individual undertake a duty relationship and may
be categorized as involving a claim for negligently causing economic damage. See, e.g., Sun
'N Sand, Inc. v. United California Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329
(1978) (common law duty of collecting bank to drawer). Cf. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1978). See also, Union Oil
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974) (Santa Barbara oil spill and fishing rights - extensive discussion of economic damages theory); Baldwin v. Marina City Prop., Inc., 79 Cal.
App. 3d 393, 145 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1978) (impairment of security interest).
20. See, e.g., Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal. App. 3d 726, 122 Cal. Rptr. 615 (1975), (surveyor);
Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 37 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1974), (title abstracter); Roberts v.
Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1967) (letter
from borrower's lawyer to lender); Zemplen v. Home Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n 221 Cal. App.
197, 34 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963) (gratuitous assurances of lender and of title company);
M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1962) (soil engineer). Cf. Gay v. Broder, 109 Cal. App. 66, 167 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1980); Walters
v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 18, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1978).
21. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); Heyer
v. Flaig, 70 Cal.2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Ventura County Humane
Soc'y, Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974). Also see Gay v.
Broder, 109 Cal. App. 3d 66, 167 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1980) (expressing similar concern regarding
duties of appraiser of realty).
22. See, e.g., Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bank of America, 57 Cal. App. 3d 241, 129
Cal. Rptr. 91 (1976). See James, supra note 4; Keeton, ProfessionalMalpractice, 17 WAsimuaN
L.J. 445 (1978).
23. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). Cf.
Rodriguez v. Campbell Indus., 87 Cal. App. 3d 494, 151 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1978) (concerning
product-related economic risks).
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defendant's contractual obligations. 24 Thus, while a lawyer has a duty of due
care to a third party to whom he gives an opinion on behalf of his client, he
ordinarily does not owe a duty to anyone but his client when he restricts his
advice or opinion to that client. 2 5 Similarly, a general contractor who contracts

to repair a building with the owner may be liable to a known lessee for loss of
2
profits caused by negligently delayed repairs.

6

It is unlikely, however, that the

contractor will be held liable for loss of profits to those supplying goods or
services to the lessee because the relationship between the supplier's injury and
27
the contractor is too distant.
The economic factors involved in a determination of the scope of duty are
implicit. A duty of due care should only be imposed when the contracting
enterpriser or professional has the capacity to control or manage the economic
risk. Thus, in such a situation loss of the privity immunity is not the end of
adequate protection for the enterpriser; rather, it is an appropriate designation
of liability commensurate with fault and risk-bearing capacity.28 Accordingly,
the movement away from the strict privity doctrine in cases involving intangible economic damage is simply a part of the continuing development of
economic fairness in tort law.
THE

FLORIDA COMPARISON

The evolution of a cause of action for intangible economic damage in
Florida has been rather different from that in California. In 1940 the Florida
2 9
supreme court decided Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., in
which the privity barrier immunized an abstractor who was employed by a
borrower to prepare an abstract for the plaintiff lender's information. Sickler
was reaffirmed almost three decades later in Investment Corp. of Florida v.
Buchman.30 The Buchman court held that an accounting firm owed no duty
to an individual who purchased stock in the accountant's corporate client despite the purchaser's known reliance on the certified financial statements prepared by the accounting firm.
24. This relationship is discussed most fully in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799,
589 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) and Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969). A duty may be undertaken in other ways than by contract. See note 19
supra.

25. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
26. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979).
27. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). See note 4 supra. Under
the theory enunciated in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 589 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr.
407 (1979), the Robins case might well have been decided in favor of the plaintiff on the
grounds of negligently causing economic loss. See note 98 infra. Compare the cases which the
California Supreme Court cited in J'Aire as denying recovery because only negligent interference with a contract was involved. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073,
7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960) (no duty to plaintiff obligated to pay medical costs of deceased whose
death caused by negligence of the defendant); Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal.
App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975), (destruction of plaintiff's place of employment).
28. The Winterbottom perspective would preclude such liability to avoid the prospect of
excessive liability. See note 11 supra.
29. 142 Fla. 528, 95 So. 195 (1940).
30. 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968).
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Although Buchman seemed to reinforce the privity doctrine, a case decided
a few years previously provided the rationale that would eventually undermine
the privity doctrine in Florida. In Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v.

D.E. Britt Associates, Inc.,31 an engineering firm negligently designed plans for
the manufacture of wooden trusses. In holding the firm liable for the economic
loss incurred by a third party manufacturer when the trusses failed, the court
relied on Florida cases applying the MacPherson rationale to personal injuries. The manufacturer's claim, however, was analyzed, not as one of products
liability but instead as one of negligent professional services. By resolving the
controversy in this manner, the court anticipated the future development of a
cause of action for economic injury in Florida.
Moyer v. Graham
In Moyer v. Graham, the Florida supreme court was presented with the
question of whether a supervisory architect could be held liable for negligently
causing economic damage to a general contractor when no contractual relationship existed between the parties. In deciding that the general contractor
had a cause of action against the architect, the supreme court wrote an opinion

that is a study in restraint and ambiguity. The Sickler and Buchman decisions
were merely discussed and dismissed without being explicitly overruled or
qualified.
Instead the supreme court relied upon two other sources in reaching its
decision. First, the court relied upon the Audlane decision, describing it as a
"natural extension" of MacPherson'sanalysis to an economic damage context.8 2
Although characterizing the historical privity requirement as a mechanism enabling contracting parties to define the limits of their liability, the court explained that the privity concept was blurred by "modern concepts of tort
33

law."

The court then turned to California cases involving economic damage and
linked them with Florida jurisprudence. 4 This link suggested that the ideas
expressed in Moyer apply in all cases of economic injury and are not limited to
the specific areas of product and construction liability involved in that case. To
emphasize the similarity of California and Florida theory, the court quoted at
length from a federal district court opinion which applied California law to a
factual situation congruent to that in Moyer.3 5 The quote cited Biakanja and
31. 168 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964).
32. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973). The opinion suggests not only that there was a "natural
extension" from MacPherson to Audlane and then to Moyer, but also that economic damage
may be as significant as personal injury. See also, J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. App. 3d

799, 805, 598 P.2d 60, 64, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (1979) ("[Injury to a tenant's business can
often result in greater hardship than damages to a tenant's person or property.").
33. 285 So. 2d at 399. "Privity is a theoretical device of the common law that recognizes
limitation of liability commensurate with compensation for contractual acceptance of risk.
The sharpness of its contours blurs when brought into contact with modem concepts of tort

liability." Id.
34. Id. at 400, referring to cases which had been cited in Geer v. Bennett, 237 So. 2d 311
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1970).
35. 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958)).
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listed its criteria while noting the demise of privity in cases involving damage
to an intangible economic interest caused by negligent performance of a contract.3 6 The Moyer court, through the federal district court, then reasoned that

the imposition of a duty on the architect was imperative because the architect
had complete control over the economic welfare of the general contractor. The
court summed up its position by stating that "such authority, exercised in such
37
a relationship, [should] carry commensurate legal responsibility."
While the court did permit a cause of action for an injury to a third party's
economic interests caused by the negligent performance of a contract, the scope
of the court's holding is uncertain. In addition to the opinion's overall restraint
and ambiguity, there is language that could be interpreted to indicate that the
supreme court based the architect's duty on the more general negligence approach of foreseeability of injury.3 8 Based on an analysis of the facts, however,
it is probable that the scope of duty the supreme court actually espoused is
narrower. Because the extremely close nexus between the general contractor
and the architect gave the architect "power of economic life or death"3 9 over the
contractor, a known third party, the creation of a duty of due care running
from the architect to the contractor was mandated. Although the Biakanja
criteria were merely quoted and not analyzed, they have been interpreted in
California as requiring a close relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, similar to the one implicit in the majority's reasoning.
The supreme court's opinion in Moyer raises many questions. Since Moyer,
the supreme court has not addressed the scope of duty issue in claims involving
intangible economic damage. As a result, Florida's district courts of appeal
have reached widely divergent opinions. Among the primary questions to be
resolved is whether the privity requirement will be dropped for only certain
36. Prior to the Moyer decision, Biakanja and its criteria had been cited in Mullray v.
Aire-Lok Co., 216 So. 2d 801, 802 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968), which recognized a claim for intangible economic damage. Since Moyer, the criteria have been quoted in McAbee v. Edwards,
340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976). The Biakanja criteria have also been quoted and
followed in a number of other jurisdictions. See cases cited in note 95, infra.
37. "Considerations of reason and policy impel the conclusion that the position and
authority of a supervising architect are such that he ought to labor under a duty to the prime

contractor.... Altogether too much control over the contractor necessarily rests in the hands
of the supervising architect for him not to be placed under a duty imposed by law.... The
power of the architect to stop the work alone is tantamount to a power of economic life or
death over the contractor. It is only just that such authority, exercised in such a relationship,

carry commensurate legal responsibility." [emphasis supplied.] 285 So. 2d at 401 (quoting
United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1968)).
38. 285 So. 2d at 402. "[A] third party general contractor, who may foresecably be injured or sustained an economic loss proximately caused by the negligent performance of a
contractual duty of an architect, has a cause of action against the alleged negligent architect."

Id. One writer has interpreted Moyer as following the "simple negligence approach." Note,
supra note 19, at 106-08.
39. See note 37 supra. The Moyer opinion also contains an extensive quote from the
Audlane case which distinguishes between determining whether a duty exists and how to
measure its extent. 285 So. 2d at 400 (quoting Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc. v.
D.E. Britt Assocs., Inc., 168 So. 2d at 335). The quote indicates that the finding of duty varies

with the circumstances, but the measure of its extent is foreseeability of injury to known users.
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occupations and enterprises or be abandoned altogether. In either event, the
inquiry then turns to the criteria to be employed for establishing a duty relationship and for defining the scope of duty. Presently, for instance, there is
disagreement concerning whether the key determinant of the existence of a
duty of due care should be based on mere foreseeability or a more complex set
of criteria such as that set forth in Biakanja.
Search for a Rationale
Moyer's handling of the strict privity requirement has been most freely
construed in cases, which, like Moyer, involve the construction industry.40
Nevertheless, Moyer's rationale has been extended to other service areas, including claims arising from the supply of products. The relevant Florida appellate opinions, although involving disparate situations, possess a common
underlying theme. Consequently, the duty imposed in each case can be evaluated narrowly in terms of the uniqueness of the particular activity or broadly
in terms of the development of a comprehensive cause of action for economic
damage.
ConstructionServices and
ProductManufacture
Audlane involved a blend of construction and product liability, yet the
court characterized the defendant engineer's product design as a professional
service, 41 even though the instrument of economic damage was a defective
product. Therefore, Audlane, endorsed in Moyer, is an important precedent
for negligence claims resulting from product-related economic damage. 42 More
recently the Audlane court decided a related case, Highlands County School
Board v. K.D. Hedin ConstructionInc.43 In Highlands,the court held that the
manufacturer of roofing material used by a sub-contractor in the constructionof a new school's roof owed a duty of due care to the school board despite the
absence of privity. It is unclear, however, whether the claim was based on
tangible property damage, such as buckling of the roof, or intangible economic
loss related to the quality of the roof. Thus, it remains to be tested whether
commercial or casual consumers, in no way connected with construction, will
40. Montgomery Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla., Inc., 362 So. 2d 145'
(Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978) (architect's duty to subcontractor). A further extension imposes a duty
on both the architect and the builder to secondary purchasers of condominium units. The
liability was for foreseeable damage without specifying the type of damage. See Parliament
Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Realty, Inc., 377 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.

1979).
41. 168 So. 2d at 334.See notes 31 & 32 and accompanying text, supra.
42. Florida has been one of the few states to recognize a claim in warranty without
privity for economic damage xelated to product use. Manheim v. Ford Motor Co., 201 So. 2d
440 (Fla.1967); Hoskins v. Jackson Grain Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Continental Copper
& Steel Indus., Inc. v. E.C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1958). For a
discussion of a policy favoring liability under a theory of warranty rather than tort, see
Rabin & Grossman, Defective Products or Realty Causing Economic Loss: Toward a Unified
Theory of Recovery, 12 Sw. U.L. Rxv. 5 (1981).

43. 382 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1980).
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have a claim for purely economic damage against a manufacturer in the absence
of privity.
The status of the distinction between property damage and intangible
economic damage remains uncertain because the issue has not been fully confronted in cases arising from the negligent performance of a service contract.
This uncertainty frequently arises in construction service cases, making subsequent comprehension of a court's holding difficult. Nevertheless, consideration of the type of damage incurred may be vital to a proper understanding of
these cases.
In Navajo Circle Inc. v. Developments Concepts Corp.,44 what appears to
be an expansive interpretation of Moyer may not be an expansion at all, depending on whether the case involved property or economic damage. In Navajo,
a condominium association and unit owner claimed an architect negligently
supervised construction and subsequent repairs of the condominium building
causing damage to the roof and walls, and loss of rental receipts. Construing
Moyer to "clearly indicate a change of direction" away from the strict privity
requirement, 45 the court stated that privity was no longer a prerequisite to a
duty of due care, regardless of the nature of the enterprise or damages involved. 46 Furthermore, according to the court, duty should be based on the same
factors supporting any negligence claim, the foreseeability of harm occurring
to a foreseeable person.4 7 Thus, according to the Navajo court, Moyer represented the full blossoming of the MacPherson perspective.
Although perhaps a safe long range prediction, it is premature to say that
Moyer has abolished the privity requirement altogether. To suggest, however,
that Moyer places all negligence suits on exactly the same footing, regardless of
the kind of damages claimed, is ill-advised. Such a position cannot be properly
asserted in light of the California-Florida nexus developed in Moyer.
In order to avoid the questionable position apparently expressed in Navajo,
its rationale may be restricted to claims for "property" damage. 48 Yet what is
imprudent about the Navajo opinion is its rhetoric, not its result. It is likely
that the same result would be obtained under the California framework. Although under the California approach the type of damages may not be important, the certainty of the injury and its causal roots are the determinative
factors. Furthermore, contrary to the language in Navajo, California courts
require a higher degree of foreseeability of economic damage than in the
ordinary negligence claim in order to limit the scope of duty and ensuing
liability.4 9 Ordinarily, the defendant must know that if he is negligent, eco-

44.

873 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).

45. Id. at 692.
46. The court alluded to the Sickler abstracter case as having involved only pecuniary
damages. See note 29 and accompanying text, supra.
47. 373 So. 2d at 692. The Navajo case was decided in the Second District where both the
Buchman and Audlane cases were decided. See notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text, supra.
48. The distinction between property damage and economic damage is often difficult to
maintain. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text, supra.
49. The importance of the degree of foreseeability is stressed in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
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nomic damage will be suffered by known individuals. Thus there is the requirement in California of a special relationship or "nexus" between plaintiff
and defendant, although it does not have to be a contractual one. 50 In all the
Florida construction cases, including Moyer and Navajo, each plaintiff permitted to pursue his claim has either been a participant in the transaction or a
successor in interest to such a participant. 51 Therefore, it appears that these
decisions were correctly decided because there was a built-in limit to potential
liability; the kind of barrier to the flood which privity more arbitrarily
52
created.
The fear of a flood of litigation has prompted courts in products cases to
distinguish between economic damage and property damage. Yet there are
other mechanisms to limit liability. For example, in a claim for the difference
between a product's price and its reduced value due to negligent manufacture,
that loss of value of the product is an inherent restriction on liability. In a
claim for loss of profits, however, the line limiting either liability or the parties
entitled to recover is much more difficult to draw. Historically, California
courts have, in products cases, left the control of purely economic damages to
the contracting parties, and denied third party claims, with an exception for
express warranties running from the manufacturer to the consumer.53 However,
claims for negligently caused property damage stemming from defective products were still allowed in California regardless of privity, because they seemed
a natural extension of claims for negligently caused personal injuries. 54 Like
bodily injury, property damage is tangible and therefore less likely to be the
subject of speculative proofs or to be precedent for endless claims. Experience
indicates, however, that the distinction between property damage and economic

24 Cal.3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979); Chameleon Eng'r Corp. v. Air Dynamics,
Inc., 101 Cal. App. 3d 418, 161 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1980).
50. See note 49 supra.
51. Parliament Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Realty, Inc., 377 So. 2d 976
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1979) (secondary purchasers); Lucian v. High, 372 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.
1979) (owner and land-testing engineer); Navajo Circle, Inc. v. Development Concepts, Corp.,
373 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979) (purchaser and architect); Montgomery Indus. Int'l,
Inc. v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Florida, Inc., 362 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978) (subcontractor and architect); Mullray v. Aire-Lok, Inc., 216 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969)
(owner and sub-contractor).
52. The Navajo court may be relying on "proximate cause" as the mechanism for limiting liability as illustrated in Montgomery Indus. Intl, Inc. v. Southern Baptist Hosp. of Fla.,
Inc., 362 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978). The California Supreme Court has noted such use
of proximate cause, but only as an add-on to the tried and tested criteria. J'Aire Corp. v.
Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 412 (1979).
53. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), discussed in S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
54. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal Rptr. 17, 24 (1965).
There is a similar consideration in the area called negligent interference with contract. Opposite results have been reached on the basis of whether there is a technical claim of injury
to property. Compare Byrd v. English, 117 Ga. 191, 43 S.E. 419 (1903) (loss of profits for
negligently cutting off electrical source, no duty) with Newlin v. New England Tel. & Tel.
Co., 316 Mass. 234, 54 N.E.2d 929 (1944) (cutting off electrical source causes loss of mushroom

crop, duty).
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damage is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. 55 There are signs of its
abandonment in California in favor of the more familiar Biakanja criteria56
Abstracters
In Kovaleski v. Tallahassee Title Co., 57 the court held that a title company
owed a duty to a purchaser who relied on its abstract despite the absence of
privity. Deeming Moyer to have implicitly overruled Sickler's privity barrier
for suits against abstracters, 58 the Kovaleski court stated that mere foreseeability defined the bounds of duty. Unfortunately, as in Navajo, the court seemed
to reach a correct decision but at the risk of formulating a standard which may
be too expansive of liability if applied in other situations.
The majority asserted that Audlane and Moyer generated the foreseeability
standard. The dissent, however, attempted to distinguish Moyer by arguing
that the architect in Moyer had greater involvement in construction than
abstracters have in land sales and financing. Yet, it is also true, as the majority
noted, that the abstracter can best manage the economic risk. The majority's
position is apparently that the imposition of a duty of due care is fundamentally fair in such circumstances. Furthermore, the value of the property
serves as a built-in limit to the abstracter's liability. Therefore, the foreseeability test may be adequate in the context of abstracter liability, but inapplicable
in other circumstances. 59 It would be more desirable to create an overriding
theory applicable in all cases of economic harm rather than a purely ad hoc
test for each enterprise.
It is possible that the Kovaleski court qualified its own foreseeability test
by relying on section 552 of the Restatement of Torts. Section 552 would im-

pose liability on professionals and enterprisers for negligent misrepresentation.60 Under the Restatement, the scope of duty is not defined by foreseeabil-

ity but more restrictively in terms of the intended or known impact of the
information supplied. Actually, the Restatement treatment of misrepresentation is only a special application of the type of criteria featured in the California approach to all cases involving economic damage. 61 A significant factor
55. See Rabin & Grossman, supra note 42. Ribstein, Guidelines for Deciding Product
Economic Loss Cases, 29 MERCER L. REv. 493 (1978).
56. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979) (recognizing general claim for negligent interference with economic advantage); International
Knights of Wine, Inc. v. Nave Pierson Winery, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 168 Cal. Rptr.
301 (1980) (defective bottle caps causing property damage in spoiling of wine).
57. 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978).
58. 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940). See note 29 and accompanying text, supra.
59. The leading case on abstracter liability in the absence of privity characterizes liability in terms of mere foreseeability. Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6, 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974).
See Urich & Milne, Abstracters' Liability - and Beyond, 53 FLA. B.J. 210 (1979).
60. "One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment ...supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions" owes a duty of due care
but only to the person or members of the "limited group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intended to supply
it" when the claimant relies on the information in the transaction or kind of transaction
intended,

61.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS

§552 (1979).

See notes 16-24 and accompanying text, supra; note 96 and accompanying text, infra.
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under the California standard is whether the professional or enterpriser knows
he will affect the third party in the performance of his contract. 2 Thus, under
either approach, duty is a matter of the defendant's appreciation of the economic risk in question and the fairness in allocating it to the defendant's
enterprise.'
Lawyers

Whether a particular economic risk of negligence should be borne by a
given profession or enterprise should, however, not always turn solely upon
the defendant's knowledge of the risk. Rather, many factors must often be
balanced. The cases which have best demonstrated the desirability and the
feasibility of balancing several factors are the California cases involving
lawyers. 63 There are also several cases involving lawyers in Florida but they
suggest that judges steeped in the insider's view of the legal profession may
have difficulty disregarding that perspective in striking the appropriate balance between fairness and utility.
McAbee v. Edwards,64 concerned a lawyer who drafted a will naming the
client's daughter as sole beneficiary. When the client remarried, she requested
a new will to assure her daughter's bequest, but the lawyer advised her that it
was unnecessary. Upon the client's death, the daughter was forced to settle
with the surviving pretermitted husband thereby suffering a substantial economic loss. Although Moyer and an earlier Florida case 65 were acknowledged,
they did not form the basis of the decision. Instead, the key authority was
Heyer v. Flaig,66 a California case involving nearly identical facts, which both

reiterated and further developed Biankanja's approach. Quoting Heyer, the
McAbee court stressed that the basis of duty was the lawyer's undertaking of a
known relationship with the non-client beneficiary whose interest was not only
foreseeable but certain. 67 In the final analysis it was that nexus, the knowing
undertaking of a special relationship, which provided a superior floodgate to
the arbitrary privity barrier.
Compare Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974) (abstracter duty
under §552) with cases cited in note 20 supra.
62. See note 95 and accompanying text, infra for further discussion of section 552.
63. For an analysis of the national trend concerning lawyer liability to non-clients, and
its relation to the general claim for economic damage, see Probert & Hendricks, supra note
19; Probert & Hendricks, The Specter of Suits by Nonclients, 67 A.B.A.J. 720 (1981). Al-

though California has had the most extensive litigation in this area, the state has not gone
as far as others in expanding the scope of duty. Probert 8&Hendricks, supra note 19, at 709
n.34. The case that goes the farthest may be Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 NJ. Super. 581, 362 A.2d
581 (1976), which imposed a fiduciary duty to a non-client who was represented by his own
lawyer.
64. 340 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976).
65. Mullray v. Aire-Lok Co. Inc., 216 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1969).
66. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
67. The leading national case on lawyer liability to non-clients is Lucas v. Hamm, 56
Cal. 2d 583, 864 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), which involved a will-drafting situation.
Cf. Ventura County Humane Soc'y, Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal; App. 3d, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1974) (limiting the scope of a will-drafting lawyer's duty despite damaging ambiguity in the

win).
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One year later in Adams v. Chenowith,68 the same court used language
which seemed to limit McAbee. The plaintiff in Adams bought realty from the
client of the lawyer defendant but made a significant overpayment due to an
error in the closing statement presented to him by the lawyer. The error, however, had not been made by the lawyer but by the holder of the agreement for
deed which the buyer assumed. The claim, therefore, could have been denied
because there was no evidence that the lawyer had been negligent. Nevertheless,
the court engaged in an unnecessary and oversimplified analysis which only
confused a complex issue. The court distinguished McAbee on the grounds
that a land sale transaction involves "two sides" while a lawyer drafting a will
is engaged in a one-sided transaction. According to the court, in a "two-sided"
transaction a lawyer can ethically represent only one side and the lawyer's duty
can only be to his client, the seller. The court then concluded that the only
basis for a claim against a lawyer by a non-client in a two-sided transaction
must be a non-negligent tort such as "fraud or theft or the like."69
Adam's "two sides" analysis was endorsed in Amey, Inc. v. Henderson,70
another Florida appellate court decision. The plaintiff in Amey unwittingly
purchased land encumbered by a tax lien. Plaintiff then sued his lender's
attorney claiming to have relied on the title opinion the attorney prepared for
the bank. Reiterating the Adams rationale, the court held the lawyer owed a
duty only to his client in a multi-sided transaction.
Both Adams and Amey would have produced similar results if they had
been analyzed in terms of Biakanja's various factors. Under the California
approach, balancing of the relevant factors would have led to the conclusion
that no duty existed. Arguably, the plaintiffs' reliance in the two cases was
foreseeable. Nevertheless, a lawyer's duty should only be extended to a third
party in situations involving more than mere foreseeability. Liability should
only exist where the attorney's actions are known to directly affect or influence
the third party's interests.7
' 1 Whether architect, abstracter, lawyer or other
enterpriser, the existence of a duty to non-contracting participants and the
scope of that duty turns on the nature of the contract between the contractor
and his employer. In Moyer, for example, the architect was contractually obligated to supervise construction and control the activities of the general contractor. In the will cases, and similar situations, the lawyer is employed to
effectuate the client's desire to further the interests of the beneficiaries who are
powerless in the matter. Thus, where lawyers or other enterprisers are involved,
analysis of the contractual relationship and of the roles that lawyers play is of
2
critical importance in determining a lawyer's duty.7
68. 349 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977).
69. Id. at 231.
70. 367 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
71. See Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (no
duty despite negligent advice to client which caused irreparable damage to non-clients)
(strong dissent). In Amey, the court noted that lawyer practice regarding real estate lien

analysis customarily varies depending on whether the client is a lender or a purchaser. 367
So. 2d at 634.
72. These factors have been stressed by the courts in several cases. See, e.g., Goodman v.
Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976); Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d
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Under the facts of Amey and Adams neither the lawyer-client contract nor
the lawyer's involvement with the non-client amounted to a knowing undertaking by the attorney for the benefit of the third party. If a known undertaking of responsibility is not a prerequisite to duty, the flood of liability feared
by the Winterbottom,73 National Savings,74 and Ultramares5 courts is predictable. Therefore, a lawyer's duty should be generally limited to his client. Any
broad duty to others, certainly one defined in terms of mere foreseeability,
would unduly burden the lawyer's relationship with his clientY0 A lawyer
ought not be saddled with concern for a non-client's economic fate when
counselling his client unless the attorney has created a justifiable reliance that
he is professionally concerned with the non-client's interests.'1 Nevertheless,
an attorney who, at his client's request, prepares an opinion providing information expected to influence a third party doing business with his client,
may, unlike the situation in Amey, 78 be reasonably and fairly held to a duty to
the third party. 79
Whether Florida courts will impose upon lawyers a duty of due care to nonclients beyond the will-drafting situation depends on the assumptions that
judges will have about their profession.80 The Winterbottom fear of unending
223,

449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969); Ventura County Humane Soc'y v. Holloway, 40
Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974). See Probert & Hendricks, supra note 19, at 714,

723-28.
73. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See notes 2 & 7 and accompanying text, supra.
74. 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See note 8 and accompanying text, supra.
75. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See notes 14-15 and
accompanying text, supra.
76. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976).
77. The possibility of justifiable reliance was discussed in Goodman 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556
P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976). In this respect, the Adams case comes closer to a duty
situation than the Amey case because in the former there were direct dealings between the
lawyer and the non-client. A lawyer is prohibited from giving legal advice to a non-client
whose interests may be in conflict with his client. FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPoNsmr.n-y D.R. 7-104(A)(2). A lawyer who negligently gives such advice ought to be held to have
a duty if there is reasonable reliance by the non-client. See RrsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs
§552 (1979). Comment d indicates that it is enough if the advice be given in the course of
the attorney's professional activity. Id., Comment d. Cf. Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So. 2d 461 (Fla.
1st D.CA. 1978) (in divorce, husband's lawyer owes no duty to wife regarding deed from
husband to wife when wife had her own lawyer). Where there are no dealings between the
lawyer and non-client, a lawyer may have the privilege to persuade his client to breach a
contract with another party. Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 90, 65 Cal. Rptr.
612 (1968); McDonald v. Stewart, 289 Minn. 35, 182 N.W.2d 437 (1970); D & C Textile Corp.
v. Rudin, 41 Misc.2d 916, 246 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §772
(1979).
78. 367 So. 2d 633. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
79. Roberts v. Bali, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr.
901 (1976). See also Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Milliner v. Elmer Fox &
Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
80. One court by dictum indicated that will-drafting involved a limited exception to the
privity requirement. Drawdy v. Sapp, 365 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1968). But see Baldock
.. Green, 109 Cal. App. 3d 234, 167 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1980) (duty of lawyer as executor to
beneficiaries of estate); Morales v. Field, 99 Cal. App. 3d 307, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979) (duty
of lawyer as trustee to beneficiaries); Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d 914, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 514 (1976) (duty to beneficiaries in drafting of trust instrument).
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liability may be compounded by the equally old assumption that a lawyer is
basically the agent and champion of his client and thus responsible only to
that client. While this attitude is prevalent in the legal profession, there is an
increasing awareness that attorneys have some responsibility to individuals
other than their clients and that there are also circumstances in which the ad82
versary model is not appropriate.81 First, not all transactions are arm's length,
and even in arm's length transactions it is possible for a lawyer to undertake
s3
some service benefiting or inducing a reasonable reliance in a non-client
Furthermore, despite the Adams dictum, it is evident that a lawyer is not
ethically prohibited from representing both buyer and seller in all land sale
transactions. 4 Thus, a duty beyond one client is permissible.
The Adams and Amey analysis oversimplifies everyday transactions by
asserting that there are "two sides" whenever the matter involves a client and
a non-client. The "two sides" analysis, however, begs the question of whether
the lawyer should be able to pull non-clients into his sphere of influence and
yet enjoy economic immunity for his negligence. 85 The lawyer who is paid to
influence a third party on his client's behalf ought to bear the risk of his own
carelessness or incompetence because he has purposely created the third party's
reliance. Under these circumstances, the third party is just as entitled to relief
as a testamentary beneficiary or the plaintiff in Moyer.
Accountants
In the situation where an accountant prepares financial statements intended
to influence third parties dealing with the accountant's clients, the case for
accountant responsibility is at least as strong as the argument for lawyers' or
other contractors' liability. Nonetheless, Buchman remains as precedent to
81. In the context of litigation, rarely will the attorney be found to owe a duty to one
other than his client. E.g., De Luca v. Whatley, 42 Cal. App. 3d 574, 117 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1973)
(no duty to client's own witness to advise witness of privilege against self-incrimination).
Recently numerous physicians have brought countersuits against lawyers who unsuccessfully
sued them for malpractice. The leading case denying a basis for claim in negligence is Norton
v. Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1975), quoted in Fee, Parker & Lloyd, P.A.
v. Sullivan, 379 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1980). But see Noble v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33
Cal. App. 3d 654, 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1973) (holding an attorney may be liable for negligence
in selecting and supervising an agency to investigate the claim of an adversary in litigation).
82.

See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT rule 2.2, Comment & Notes (Proposed

Final Draft 1981); Probert & Hendricks, supra note 19, at 723-28.
83. See, e.g., Simmerson v. Blanks, 149 Ga. App. 478, 254 S.E.2d 716 (1979) (agreeing to
record instruments for non-client); Schwarz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc. 2d 882,
396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1977).
84. The Florida Code of Professional Responsibility permits representation of multiple
clients in a transaction under certain circumstances. FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSI-

BILITY D.R. 5-105. The Adams court mistakenly cited to E.C. 5-14 which is not prohibitory.
id. E.C. 5-14. See also The Florida Bar v. Teitelman, 261 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1972).
85. See RFSTATEMENT §766C, Comment e (general principle of due care owed in direct
dealings). There is one other lawyer case in Florida, Amsler v. American Home Assurance
Co., 348 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1977), which denies any duty from the lawyer representing
a limited partnership to the limited partners, by analogy to the corporate lawyer and the
shareholders.
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preserve the general immunity of accountants. Buchman, decided prior to
6
Moyer, upheld the strict privity barrier in a case involving accountants and
remains the leading, though considerably weakened, authority for accountant
immunity.8 7 Buchman's approach to accountant immunity was reaffirmed after
Moyer in Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath.8 8 The Investors court ignored Moyer and section 552 of
the Restatement of Torts as well as developments around the country.8 9
Buchman did not, however, preclude the possibility of holding an accountant liable under third party beneficiary contract theory.90 If an accountant, at
the direction of his client, prepared a financial statement for a specific third
party, the Buchman court would apparently approve liability.91 While other
courts have used third party beneficiary theory to limit liability for economic
damage, 92 its more usual function has been to provide an acceptable transition
86. Investment Corp. of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968),
followed in Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968).
87. Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1142 (1977) (waiting for overruling of Buchman case, especially in light of dictum in
Chelsea Title Guaranty v. Louis Briggs Constr., Inc., 315 So. 2d 229 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975),
later rejected by same court in the Kovaleski case, 363 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978)
wherein court found no reason to distinguish an abstracter from an architect). Cf. Sherman v.
Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1972). The Sherman court expressed doubt that privity
will be required for accountants in Florida especially in light of the paradox that if the accountant was an employee, his client could be held under duty to the third party. Id. at 1240.
88. 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
89. It is doubtful, however, that any court would impose a duty under the stated facts
of the case. The court did correctly note that Buchman had relied on the leading case of
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y.2d 356, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (the defendant-accountants
had prepared 32 balance sheets for use in various financial dealings, most likely to obtain
credit). The court also relied on subsequent interpretations of Ultramares by New York
courts even though Ultramares had been overruled to the extent that it rejected Glanzer
and its extension in §552 of the RESATEmENT (SEcoND) of Torts. See White v. Guarente, 43
N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d 315 (1977). The White court noted the distinction between the
Glanzer and Ultramarescases, the former applying when the recipients are specifically foreseen. Id. at 358, 372 N.E.2d at 318. The emerging trend in the United States is to extend the
duty of accountants to third parties within the limits of Section 552 of the Restatement and
the Biakanja criteria. See Epstein & Weiss, A Practical Guide to Accountants" Legal Liability
(1977); Keeton, supra note 22, at 445; Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to
Third Parties,52 NOr DAME LAW. 838 (1977); Note, Accountants' Liability for Negligence:
A Contemporary Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FoRDtAM L. Rnv. 401 (1979).
90. Accord Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976). See
also Mulligan v. Wallace, 349 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977) (third party beneficiary theory
not applicable to facts); Dubbin v. Touche Ross & Co., 324 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975).
91. See also Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1968). It
has been suggested that in Florida proof of negligence would satisfy the scienter requirement
of a fraud claim. Ostreyko v. B.C. Morton Organ, Inc., 310 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 3d D.CA. 1975).
See also Urich & Milne, supra note 59, at 214. The point is discussed wth some expression of
dismay in Sherman v. Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1972). The apparent source of the
idea is Watson v. Jones, 41 Fla. 241, 25 So. 678 (1899), dearly indicating that the circumstances of the appropriate case would be such as to give rise to a presumption of knowledge
of falsity, one where a disclaimer of lack of knowledge of falsity is unbelievable.
92. See Just's Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 583 P.2d 997 (1978). just's
uses the theory in a situation very like that of J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 CaL 3d 799, 598
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into pure tort theory.93 The tort approach may be preferable to contract theory
because it will prevent disclaimers or limitations of liability by the contracting
parties. The accountant is then put to the more straightforward alternative of
qualifying his statements on their face or risking liability. In Florida, however,
any extension of the theory endorsed in Buchman seems to have been pre94
cluded by its rejection in the Moyer opinion.
Although third party beneficiary theory would provide a means for third
party recovery while preventing a flood of litigation, it falls short of the policy
of both section 552 of the R.estatement of Torts and the California approach.
The appropriateness of these approaches with respect to accountants is
especially marked because they both arise from the same sources, Glanzer and
its distinction from Ultramares. On the other hand, because the expert information which accountants provide to third parties on behalf of their clients
may have a wider distribution than the work product of abstracters and lawyers,
the standard of mere foresecability, as alluded to in Moyer, ought not to be
applied to accountants. The tremendous number of foreseeable users of financial statements would simply place accountants under too great a risk. In
fact, the potential distribution and the ensuing unlimited liability were very
possibly the basis of concern implicit in Buchman and the later Investors decision.95 Moyer, however, if correctly interpreted as adopting the California
approach, only imposes a duty on contractors for intangible economic damage
when they control the economic risks involved.
CONCLUSION

The Florida supreme court rejected the privity requirement for economic
damage in Moyer. The facts of Moyer were compelling because the architect's
control over the general contractor made it unfair to saddle the general contractor with economic risks beyond his control. The duty of a lawyer to his
client's testamentary beneficiary seems equally compelling, even if for different
reasons. Even when the facts in a particular instance are not so compelling, a
duty of due care owed to a third party is justified whenever the professional is
employed to influence the third party for a client's benefit. It is inconsistent
P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979), in which the court invoked the theory of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. Regarding third party beneficiary theory, see,
Keeton, supra note 22, at 449; Note, supra note 20, at 100-04.
93. Thus, it was a make-weight reason in Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 820 P.2d 16 (1958),
and dropped as superfluous in Heyer, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969).
94. Moyer v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 402 (Fla. 1973). See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan
Constr. Co. of Texas, 551 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1977).
95. Compare the discussion of the abstracter situation, notes 57-62, supra, with that of
the construction situations, notes 41-47 and accompanying text, supra.
Two opinions which extend the accountants' duty to include those not in privity
criticize the Buchman opinion for its approach to the Glanzer-Ultramaresdistinction. Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 92 (D.R.I. 1968); Aluma-Kraft Mfg Co. v. Elmer Fox
& Co., 493 S.W.2d 878, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The congruency of section 552 of the Restatement and the Biakanja criteria in the case of accountants is demonstrated in Ryan v.
Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., ,t93 S.W.2d
378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973); Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974).
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and unfair to inform the recipient of such information that he is justified in
relying upon it yet burden him with the economic risk that it was negligently
prepared. Placing the economic risk on the third party is particularly unwarranted when the information supplier knows the extent of the risk and
may, by fee, insurance or other means be in a superior position to manage that
risk. Although Moyer did not involve this situation, it evinces clearly that
theme of professional and economic responsibility.96
Privity is no longer necessary in negligence claims for economic damage in
97
California. Indeed, the California Supreme Court, in J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory
has developed the theme of economic responsibility coinciding with economic
control. In Gregory, the court upheld a cause of action for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage. In applying the criteria and
policies of Biakania to this-new cause of action, the California Supreme Court
has simply displayed a greater sensitivity to the economics of risk allocation.
In California, claims for economic damage may now arise from sources other
than the negligent performance of contracts."8 For example, in a claim for economic loss due to an airplane crash, the result would turn not on privity but
on the economic fairness of imposing the loss on the activity causing the harm.
Obviously, attention must be given to the activity's ability to absorb the risk
as well as to the potential flood of liability which could result from placing a
duty on an enterprise beyond its ability to control. The privity doctrine was
inadequate to deal with these concerns simply because it denied recovery regardless of the circumstances.
In Florida, any court which uses privity to immunize an activity or enterprise, ought, at the very least, be prepared to acknowledge that it is no longer
a meaningful reason. California's experience demonstrates that fears of boundless exposure are no longer justified if an appropriate set of guidelines is
employed. Nevertheless, because the provision of a barrier against unlimited
liability is necessary, loose formulations of liability for economic damage that
call for mere foreseeability will ultimately work against themselves. Although
foreseeability may be adequate for personal injury or property damage claims,
or even to define abstracter negligence, it is unsuitable to analyze the liability
of accountants, lawyers and other enterprisers whose services impact a larger,
often indeterminate, class. The appropriate limiting mechanism would not be
easy to invent out of whole cloth, but the common law process has by now
developed one.
96. There are several Florida cases not previously cited herein which contemplate the extent of duty. E.g., Gulfstar, Inc. v. Advance Mortgage Corp., 376 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979)
(duty of seller of goods re ownership identification); Armetta v. Clevetrust Realty Investors,
359 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 4th D.CA. 1978) (duty of lenders); Dunson v. Stockley, Whatley, Davin
& Co., 346 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977) (duty of lenders); VTN Consol., Inc. v. Coastal
Eng'r Assocs., Inc., 341 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976) (dictum re duty of map draftsman).
97. 24 Cal.3d 799, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 598 P.2d 60 (1979). See Note, Negligent Interference
with Prospective Economic Advantage-JAire Corp. v. Gregory, 1980 UTAH L. RV. 431

(1980).
98. In the J'Aire case, the court distinguished the situations involving negligent inter-

ference with contract, a distinction that will be difficult to maintain. J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory,
24 Cal. 3d 799, 598 P.2d 60, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407 (1979). See notes 4, 27 &54, supra.
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In replacing the privity doctrine, Florida, or any other jurisdiction, need
not adopt California's exact framework. Yet certain elements in that framework, and in the approach of section 552 of the Restatement of Torts, such as
the inclusion of an almost self-limiting extension of economic responsibility,
are necessary. Critical to the limitation of liability is the insistence upon a
higher degree of foreseeability than is sufficient in general negligence law and
a nexus between the defendant's activity and the alleged damage. In practice,
these two requirements result in the identification of a special relationship
between the defendant and the plaintiff in which the risk of economic loss is
known by the defendant. 99 Thus, the demise of privity does not deprive contractors of the means of risk management. It does, however, involve them in a
greater degree of responsibility.
99. Such a special relationship may be voluntarily undertaken. Barfield v. Addington, 149
So. 893 (Fla. 1932); Florida Southern Abstract & Title Co. v. Biellos, 346 So. 2d 635 (Fla.
App. 1977).
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